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Traceability and Information Technology in the Meat Supply 
Chain: Implications for Firm Organization and Market 
Structure
Brian L. Buhr
The traditional food supply chain is arranged as a complex array of producers, handlers, processors, manufacturers, 
distributors, and retailers. As the food supply chain grew in complexity over time, little emphasis was placed on pre-
serving information regarding the origin of raw materials and their transformation, often by multiple handlers, into 
consumer-ready products. This paper provides case illustrations of the implementation of information systems for 
support of traceability in Europe. Observations on these firms coupled with the literature on information asymmetry 
and transactions costs is used to provide insights into how traceability implementation might affect U.S. meat-industry 
structure.
tion technology (IT) and information systems (IS) 
have made it economically feasible to develop lo-
gistics management and monitoring which enable 
traceability of food products through the labyrinth 
of the agricultural food supply chain. Because trace-
ability and information systems reside at the nexus 
of firms’ market interface it is naturally expected 
to have implications for the already evolving meat 
supply-chain organization. 
A few recent economic studies have addressed 
the traceability issue. Liddell and Bailey (2000) 
examine the broader market implications of trace-
ability by ranking the relative development of trace-
ability systems in the U.S. to other competing coun-
tries in world markets. They suggest that the U.S. 
lags in areas of both food safety and quality control, 
particularly when compared to European suppliers 
such as Denmark and the UK. A recent study by 
Dickinson and Bailey (2002) shows that consumers 
in the U.S. may be willing to pay for traceability and 
transparency in meat products. Hooker, Nayga, and 
Siebert (1999) examine the food-safety activities in 
the beef industry and primarily focus on the results 
of surveys regarding the ability to implement food-
safety practices, including traceable supply chains. 
Most processors in the U.S. and Australia viewed 
this as technically feasible, but the particulars of 
how it might be implemented or the economic costs 
of implementation are not directly addressed. Hobbs 
(1996) develops an economic-engineering approach 
to examine implementation of traceability in beef 
processing. 
This paper seeks to address the broader market 
structure and governance issues related to trace-
ability through examination of existing meat sup-
ply-chain traceability systems in European meat 
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Food safety issues in meat and livestock have come 
to the forefront in recent years. High profile inci-
dences of contamination by E. coli, BSE, dioxin, 
hormones, and antibiotics have contributed to a de-
sire to find ways to improve quality-control systems 
in the meat supply chain. The meat industry has also 
implemented extensive branding of non-observable 
product attributes (credence attributes) including 
hormone-free (e.g., Coleman Beef) organic, free-
range, and antibiotic-free , in an attempt to differ-
entiate products to consumers.
In response to demand for improved quality con-
trol and differentiation, the U.S. meat sector has 
undergone market structure changes (Lawrence et 
al. 1997; Hurt 1994). Martinez (2002) succinctly 
describes the structural change of the U.S. meat 
and poultry sector towards vertical coordination and 
contracting in the 1990s as driven by concerns for 
“improved quality control demands of specialized 
large scale production systems.” He further states 
that contracts and vertical coordination “provided 
an efficient means of organizing markets by reduc-
ing these transactions costs.” 
Into this combination of increased demands for 
food safety in meats, differentiated product attri-
butes, branding, and structural change has come the 
information technology revolution exemplified by 
the Internet and the underlying information-technol-
ogy hardware (e.g., increased computer processor 
speeds, increased data-storage capacity, electronic 
data capture and measurement devices). Informa-14   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3) Buhr Traceability and Information Technology in the Meat Supply Chain   15
and poultry processing firms. The paper integrates 
the theory of firm organization and integration with 
case-study observations from Europe. First, the fun-
damental market-structure issue of why traceabil-
ity is adopted in meat supply chains is addressed. 
This is followed by focusing on how traceability 
is expected to affect meat supply-chain organiza-
tion and structure couched in the literature of the 
theory of the firm. Finally, the direct internal firm 
economic implications are examined; these include 
the implications for recall costs and the impacts of 
traceability-derived process-information effects on 
production management.
Case Methods and Participants
Six European organizations employing traceability 
programs in meat or poultry were chosen for this 
investigation. The criteria for choosing participants 
was that they must have an electronic-based trace-
ability system which encompasses live-animal 
production through retail sale of meat or poultry 
products. 
Primary contacts were made through USDA 
Foreign Agriculture Service offices in the country 
of the firms; contacts were then followed to identify 
key personnel in the production system. The six 
participating entities include a poultry-production 
system (Label Rouge/Challans, France); an egg-
production system (KAT/Wiesengold, Germany); 
a salmon-production system (Intentia/Nutreco, 
Norway); a veal-production system (The VanDrie 
Group, Netherlands); a lamb, pork, and beef supply 
chain (Scase-Intentia/Gilde, Norway); and a beef-
production system (Scotbeef, Scotland). In examin-
ing these systems several supporting organizations 
were also visited, including the Poultry, Livestock, 
and Meat Board in the Netherlands, several govern-
mental agencies in France, Carrefour supermarkets 
in France and ASDA supermarkets in the UK. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the characteris-
tics of the firms included in the case studies. The 
objectives of the site visits were to document the 
supply-chain production protocols, to examine 
alternative forms of governance structures for sup-
ply-chain traceability, and to document methods of 
electronic traceability. A team of two researchers 
conducted site visits. Site visits included one- or 
two-day visits to key production facilities (feed 
mill, farm, processing, and retail). The team also 
met with key personnel at each stage of the process 
to interview them regarding their experience. 
In all cases, the traceability systems extend from 
the feed-manufacturing process through retail. Also, 
each case has unique production protocols that 
support the development of particular consumer-
product attributes such as organic, group-housing, 
free-range, or antibiotic-free production. All are also 
clearly focused on the issue of food safety. The pro-
duction protocols typically stipulate production in-
puts such as feeds, health treatments, animal-rearing 
methods (e.g., non-cage, group housing, free-range) 
and genetics. Production protocols are enforced at 
all stages of the production process by third-party 
auditing of production records. Methods for moni-
toring production included sampling of feces, feed, 
or meat; cross-referencing feed-delivery timing and 
use to correlated production variables such as daily 
gain; and site visits by auditing firms or certified 
veterinary or farm-management services. Finally, 
all firms had vertical organizational and governance 
structures to manage and implement the production 
and information systems.1 
Why is Electronic Supply Chain Traceability 
Adopted?
When case participants were asked why they ad-
opted traceability, the first response in every case 
was, “Consumers demanded to know where their 
food came from and how it was produced.” Histori-
cal food-safety issues such as dioxin contamina-
tion; BSE in cattle; radiation contamination; and 
increased demand for organic, non-GMO, or free-
range products were all cited as contributing to the 
consumers’ preferences. Mostly these are credence 
attributes that are only verifiable by assurances of 
the seller. 
To achieve the objective of informing consumers 
of quality, all case participants had implemented 
branding and product labeling. For example, Label 
Rouge is a labeling scheme created by the French 
Ministry of Agriculture that can be used only if 
food products meet a specified production protocol, 
certification/auditing process, and observable qual-
ity difference from other food in the category. The 
consumer relies on the assurances provided by the 
1 The specific production protocols, tracking systems, 
auditing procedures and their organizational structures are 
too detailed to report here. They are available from the author 
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Table 1. Overview of Firms in Case Study.
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Label Rouge brand with government assurances. 
KAT/Wiesengold (eggs) and the VanDrie Group 
extended their branding claims to include their 
unique production standards and auditing systems 
along with numerical or bar codes on their products. 
The bar codes can be used by consumers to access 
websites and learn more about where their products 
originated (farm through packaging), a limited set of 
information on the production protocols, any qual-
ity-assurance tests which had been done, and their 
results. For an illustration, visit VanDrie’s customer 
website at http://www.vealvision.com.
The immediate question is why didn’t these or-
ganizations view traditional branding as sufficient 
for providing consumer assurances between the 
final handler and the consumer? 2 Akerlof’s (1970) 
seminal article on the used-car market points out 
that information asymmetry between the seller and 
buyer can lead to market failure. For the traceability 
cases described above, the relevant argument pre-
sented by Akerlof is that “lemons” or poor-quality 
products drive out the “good”-quality products if the 
seller knows the quality of product while the buyer 
does not. Therefore, the argument that “consumers 
demanded traceability” rests on the fact that many 
of the product attributes claimed (organic, free 
range, group housed, specified feed or ingredient 
treatments) are unobservable to the final consumer 
and so may be regarded with skepticism. However, 
as described by Leland (1979), product labeling, 
licensing or certification, and repeat purchases are 
key remedies for information asymmetry between 
the seller and buyer. The consumer can identify 
the brand, and if inferior quality is discovered the 
consumer will either seek compensation or the 
reputation of the brander will be damaged so that 
repeat purchases will not occur. In this case, Label 
Rouge’s branding and certification scheme (see 
Figure 1) would be viewed as sufficient without 
the need to adopt traceability per se as a further 
assurance mechanism to the consumer as all cases 
have done. This is borne out by VanDrie, KAT, 
Gilde, and Scotbeef, who report that they have not 
been able to capture any additional profits beyond 
their branding due to traceability systems per se. 
The premiums observed are in fact attributed to 
the product-attribute claims such as organic or free 
range that were labeled prior to the implementation 
of traceability. 
The argument for branding and labeling as a 
remedy for information asymmetry only holds if 
the final handler has total control or certainty over 
attribute claims made in the production process. 
Production uncertainty is potentially exacerbated in 
the food supply chain with the interdependence of 
production processes undertaken by upstream firms 
independent from the final handler and with the ad-
ditional potential for agency problems such as moral 
hazard or opportunism. Hennessy (1996) addresses 
the issue of information asymmetry in the context of 
product quality and grading uncertainty at the wheat 
farm---grain elevator interface. Hennessy demon-
strates that, given quality uncertainty, the inability 
of grading systems to adequately identify food 
quality standards, and the presence of costly and 
destructive testing, a price-grade incentive structure 
will cause an “under-investment in farm-level food 
quality control.” Hennessy also explicitly makes the 
caveat that this is especially the case when “food 
leaves the farm and is not primary-source identified 
thereafter.” Under-investment issues become even 
more acute and cumulative when the quality trait of 
concern might enter at multiple stages of the supply 
chain as is the case in many food-safety examples 
such as E. Coli or salmonella contamination.
The key question now is phrased slightly dif-
ferently: why isn’t simple product labeling within 
the supply chain also effective in solving the in-
formation asymmetry problem? As suggested by 
Williamson (1981), the cost-benefit relationship 
of overcoming information asymmetry within the 
supply chain turns on the issues of agency costs 
(correcting for moral hazard and opportunism) and 
transactions costs to determine their effectiveness. 
Agency cost in this context is a subset of transac-
tion costs involving monitoring of compliance by 
the principal (in the cases studied here, the principal 
would be the firm holding the brand or trademark; 
e.g., KAT, Label Rouge, VanDrie, Scotbeef) or fi-
nal handler (Mahoney 1992; Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Some attribute specifications or cost incur-
rence by the agents (farms) to achieve differentia-
tion are easily observable to the principal. Examples 
2 The final-handler terminology is used because often 
the final meat product was branded as a case-ready product 
through retail. In this case, while the grocer might be the true 
interface with the consumer, the branding done by the case-
ready manufacturer is the identity presented to the consumer 
and the one who will be identified with any substandard product 
attributes. In other cases, the grocer was both the brander and 
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Figure 1. Sample Organizational Structure of Label Rouge.
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- Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Finance both approve Certifying Organizations. 
- Certifying Organizations report to both Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Finance. 
- Synalaf is a Quality Groupe that oversees all Label Rouge Poultry 
- Sylac falls under Synalaf as one particular set of standards for Label Rouge Poultry. There are 
many other Groupes. 
- Synalaf acts as liaison for standards approval and control for producers 
- Sylac manages operations of groupe – maintains records, reports to Synalaf on controls, 
coordinates quality certification (e.g., site visits), and reconciles traceability checkpoints (e.g., 
feed quantity w/ number of birds fed or chicks delivered and chicks slaughtered. 
- Ministry of Agriculture, Certifying Organizations and Sylac/Synalaf all maintain databases of 
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include free-range production or group housing. 
However, others—such as the purchase of organic 
feed inputs or the abstinence from antibiotics or 
hormones—are more difficult to assess and incur 
greater monitoring costs. Moral hazard and oppor-
tunism become even greater issues when products 
are aggregated, disaggregated and mixed, when 
there are long lags between consumption and the 
manifestation of the product defect (e.g., BSE), and 
when the product-attribute value becomes greater. 
For example, KAT reported wide-spread cheating 
by farmers misrepresenting conventional eggs for 
organic eggs prior to traceability because the price 
of organic eggs was approximately twice the price 
of conventional eggs. 
A similar problem emerges in employee-team 
relations and (Jones 1994). As the final value of 
the differentiated product becomes higher and task 
or input visibility becomes lower, the incentives 
for shirking or free-riding become greater. Further, 
in the circumstance of low task observability and 
high differentiation value, there is a strong potential 
benefit to monitoring, but the costs become greater 
as monitoring typically requires an increased num-
bers of supervisors. The analogous “team” problem 
in traceability is that the final handler (packer or 
retailer) acts as a supervisor by bearing responsi-
bility for quality and aggregates a large number 
of producers (employees). This explains why final 
handlers nearly always direct the production sys-
tems. “Packer-marketers” organized KAT, Ekro (the 
meat processor) coordinated the VanDrie Group, 
and Scotbeef was coordinated by the packer at the 
instruction of retailers that used store branding. 
This finding has implications for how U.S. firms 
make the decision to adopt traceability. Consumer 
demand in itself is not a sufficient primary reason. 
Branding, labeling and certification can overcome 
the handler-consumer information-asymmetry prob-
lem. However, the attempt to overcome information 
asymmetry between the final handler and consumer 
through branding, combined with inter-firm sup-
ply-chain information asymmetry and production 
uncertainty concentrates the incentive for traceabil-
ity on the final handler, who then has an incentive 
to require compliance by suppliers. Figure 2 pro-
vides a decision schematic for assessing whether 
firms should consider traditional remedies such as 
branding, labeling, and certification programs or if 
supply-chain traceability might provide a superior 
solution. Ultimately the decision will depend on 
careful consideration of the empirical implemen-
tation costs and expected value of reduction in 
information asymmetries.
Overcoming  Supply-Chain  Information 
Asymmetry: Organization and Traceability
Historically, the organizational literature suggests 
the remedy for information asymmetry in the pro-
duction chain is for firms to vertically integrate or 
contract to reduce transaction and agency costs 
(e.g., Coase 1937; Williamson 1971, 1981, 1985; 
Hart 1995). As transactions costs, moral hazard, 
and information asymmetry increase, the “make or 
buy decision” increasingly tilts toward “make” and 
the firms vertically contract or take direct vertical 
ownership.
As summarized in Mahoney (1992), transac-
tions-costs theory suggests specific advantages 
of vertical ownership, including profit allocation, 
coordination and control to overcome supply 
uncertainty, superior auditing powers of the firm 
compared to open market mechanisms, ability to 
motivate directly, and effective communication of 
information (see also Williamson 1971). 
However, there are noted downsides to vertical 
ownership and contracting, including the fact that 
contracts are incomplete (Hart 1995; Williamson 
1971). In particular, this can lead to a unique form of 
transactions costs described by Williamson (1981) 
as “asset specificity costs.” If firms must invest in 
specific assets, they will be subject to opportunism 
or hold-up and are not likely to invest in systems, 
which are costly, in order to provide the desired 
output quality to downstream firms. Jones and Hill 
(1988) describe disadvantages as increasing the size 
of the organization, which increases the potential for 
exceeding bounds of rationality (see also William-
son 1981). Williamson (1985) further suggests that 
vertical ownership blunts high-powered market in-
centives that can undercut the primary profit motive. 
Mahoney (1992) summarizes the disadvantages to 
vertical financial ownership as limited access to 
knowledge of other suppliers, excess investment 
in sunk costs, high exit barriers, inability to achieve 
synergy in economies of scale at multiple stages of 
the supply chain, and related capacity imbalances. 
In summary, while vertical integration may serve 
as a governance solution to problems of informa-
tion asymmetry, agency, and transactions costs, it 
remains an empirical decision to determine whether 18   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3) Buhr Traceability and Information Technology in the Meat Supply Chain   19
Figure 2. Balance of the Decision Process for Traceability or if Traditional Remedies Such as Brand-
ing, Repeat Purchases or Certification/Licensing Are Sufficient.
Traceability Preferred      Traditional RemediesPreferred
YES
Information Asymmetry In 
Upstream Process? 
YES
Information Asymmetry In Final 
Handler – Consumer Interface? 
YES
Limited Number of Suppliers 
High Frequency Purchase? 
YES
Low Task Observability? 
YES
High Production Quality/Quantity 
Uncertainty in Upstream Suppliers? 
YES Credence Attributes?  YES
YES
High Supervision or Monitoring 
Costs of Tasks and Attributes? 
YES
Pre-existing Vertical Production 
Coordination?  YES20   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3) Buhr Traceability and Information Technology in the Meat Supply Chain   21
firms facing the primary issues of improving food 
safety while offering products with unobservable 
attributes should develop vertically aligned gover-
nance structures. This in turn depends on the costs 
of open-market acquisitions (search costs), supply 
uncertainty (both quantities and quality), and moni-
toring and certifying costs versus complete verti-
cal control where the supply-chain integrity can be 
managed by fiat but which will incur the deficiencies 
described earlier. As stated by Williamson (1981), 
“The object is to match governance structures to the 
attributes of transactions in a discriminating way.” 
None of the literature examined, however, addresses 
this issue when information technology is adopted 
at the boundary of the firm as it is in traceability.
Traceability: Description of Information Technical 
Change at the Boundary of the Firm
As suggested in the firm organization literature, 
monitoring costs of compliance necessary for certi-
fying can be extremely high even in internal produc-
tion processes (Jones 1994). Additionally, without 
information systems that can coordinate thousands 
of individual farms, animals, and resulting meat 
products, even a vertically integrated firm would 
likely experience the limits of management’s abil-
ity to oversee the complex supply chain (bounded 
rationality, as in Williamson 1981). 
While information systems will be shown to 
assist management and coordination, logistics 
management in production is also critical. Animal 
supplies, slaughter times and locations, feed deliv-
eries, and other aspects are all tightly coordinated. 
Animals must be identified when they are born, 
carefully tracked as they are moved between farms, 
and then tracked at slaughter if they are to be identi-
fied by the final product. The most intensive points 
of logistics are at aggregation/dispersion points for 
inputs (e.g., feed plants with ingredient inputs and 
packing plants where carcasses are disassembled). 
Batch integrity quickly becomes an important pro-
duction-management tool by reducing the sheer 
number of observations (e.g., animals vs. pens vs. 
barns vs. farms). 
For example, the VanDrie Group veal-process-
ing system tracks individual animals through the 
processing chain to the point where a final retail-
portion cut at retail could be tracked to an individual 
animal. This incremental product-tracking system 
required them to reconfigure their entire cut floor 
and handling system in manufacturing fresh veal 
cuts. They estimated costs for complete imple-
mentation of the information system (scanners, 
production-chain changes, additional employees) 
in a single veal-processing plant at $6.5 million 
and approximately $24 million dollars to imple-
ment it across their feed manufacturing, farms, and 
processing plants. 
To put the costs in perspective, the VanDrie 
Group consists of two slaughter plants which each 
slaughter approximately 350,000 head of calves 
per year, 100 farm operations, three veal fabrica-
tion and processing plants (primals are shipped in 
and converted to case-ready) and two milk-powder 
manufacturing plants for feed (~100,000 tons per 
plant per year). To contrast, Gilde, which had re-
cently built a slaughter plant capable of individual 
cut tracking, estimated the cost of the information 
system components (i.e., industrial personal com-
puter stations, servers, and software) to be only 
about $150,000 for a single slaughter plant similar 
in capacity to VanDrie’s Ekro plant. While these 
figures are rough estimates, it illustrates the point 
that the information-system requirements are rela-
tively inexpensive, but configuring the production 
process to maintain traceability to the cut level is 
quite expensive. Thus a very important consider-
ation is the economic trade-off inherent in the level 
of traceability desired (e.g., individual retail-ready 
cuts vs. individual animals, vs. farm, etc.).
Figure 3 shows a schematic of Gilde Norge’s 
information system implemented with assistance 
from SCASE (hardware development) and Inten-
tia (software development). It is representative of 
other state-of-the-art systems observed. Figure 3 
shows an overall product-supply chain including 
farms, ingredient suppliers (for simplicity simply 
feed, but can include seasonings at processing), the 
retail/distribution stage, consumers, and the slaugh-
ter and processing plant itself. The vertical members 
of the supply chain all connect into the traceable 
information flow via the Internet; there is typically 
a dedicated server that provides the interface and 
database for the traceability data. 
Each entity may maintain their own servers for 
their specific databases and simply allow queries 
through their firewall, or there may be a central 
system managed by one of the entities on behalf of 
the participants. The latter is often the case between 
farms and processors or feed suppliers, since few 
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(knowledge or capital) to create an internal infor-
mation system with Internet capabilities.
Underpinning the Internet—which allows con-
nectivity between firms—is each firm’s internal 
information system or enterprise resource planning 
systems (ERPs). ERPs are simply the platforms on 
which company-specific information resides (a 
prototypical structure is shown in Figure 3). The 
ERP will locally store all information regarding all 
activities electronically collected by the firm. The 
left side of the diagram illustrates the structure for 
Gilde to actually interface the physical data of the 
product with the digital traceability record. 
 A good example of the efficiency of these 
systems for managing products occurs in the case 
of feed milling. Navobi, one of the feed suppliers 
for the VanDrie Group, uses electronic ration bal-
ancing for their milk-replacer mixing. As a result 
they are able to uniquely identify all sources and 
quantities of ingredients in each batch of milk re-
placer. A subset of this information (ingredient list, 
batch identification number, and microbiological 
assays) is uploaded to their web server and can be 
accessed via a password. Subsequent stages in the 
chain (veal farmers and packers) can examine this 
information, but cannot access other information 
which may be proprietary, such as the proportion of 
ingredients used in the formulation or the price of 
ingredients. The merits of this information system 
are considerable, in that it captures the efficiency of 
production-management systems, enabling efficient 
transmission of information to upstream and down-
stream participants in the chain while maintaining 
security for the entity. 
A component equally important for gathering 
data is measurement hardware. Weigh scales with 
data ports, visual carcass-grading technologies 
which enable capture of key carcass parameters, 
and water-monitoring devices for measuring mixing 
ratios of calf-milk replacer are all examples of data-
collection devices which greatly enhance the ability 
to capture production information. These lower the 
transactions costs of collection by reducing labor 
requirements, improving accuracy, and avoiding 
the error (or moral hazard) of human input. At this 
point, processing plants (feed and meat/egg) have 
a much higher level of automated data collection 
hardware than do farms. This is particularly true in 
cases where the farms are mostly independent from 
the rest of the chain. 
In addition to measurement devices, there must 
be methods to physically identify products. The 
everyday barcode is still the primary method for 
labeling products. In the VanDrie case, each ani-
mal enters the plant with an ear tag printed with 
a 12-digit barcode. This barcode is the animal’s 
identification number and is cross-tabulated with 
the truck license plate and farm information, which 
has been manually keyed into a personal computer 
with a local area network connection. The animal-
identification number remains with the carcass at all 
times through sequential bar-coding. At the process-
ing stages where primals and subsequent cuts are 
removed, barcode tags are created by printers and 
attached to each part of the animal as it is removed 
from the aggregate carcass. The unique barcodes of 
each cut are also entered into the ERP system. This 
process continues until the final case-ready product 
is labeled with a barcode (this is in addition to the 
sale barcode, which contains pricing information 
as well) and can be identified through retail scan-
ning. Two firms (Gilde and VanDrie) experimented 
with implantable microchips and radio frequency 
transmitters (RFIDs) but found them to be unreli-
able (migration in the animal and reading problems 
cited) compared to inexpensive barcodes.
Traceability: Implications for the Organizational 
Structure of the Firm
Information technology and traceability represents 
a technical innovation to reduce information-trans-
actions costs. It does this by enabling improved re-
porting by providing access in real-time, which im-
proves planning decisions in the supply chain, and 
by providing a digital record of transactions which is 
easily queried should there be a need to trace a prod-
uct. It can also improve monitoring, since electronic 
certificates and passwords accessible only to key 
personnel (such as certifying agencies) can secure 
the databases. The interesting question is whether 
this transaction-cost-related technical change will 
lead to greater incentives for vertical ownership, 
facilitate improved contracting relationships, or 
even favor open markets if relevant information is 
readily available to all buyers and sellers. From a 
purely transactions-cost perspective it would appear 
that this would tilt the balance toward open markets 
because of improved communications (Williamson 
1971) and improved monitoring (Leland 1979). In 
addition, the implementation of on-line measure-
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measures direct production reduces the potential 
for agency problems (i.e., opportunism of record-
ing misinformation is also reduced). Conversely, 
traceability with information networks overcomes 
the limitation of bounded rationality in favor of 
vertical integration and scale economies, and may 
improve the ability to approach complete contracts 
(Hart 1995; Williamson 1971) with improved infor-
mation and monitoring. 
The impact of information technology and infor-
mation systems on organizational structure in the 
previous literature is ambiguous. Malone, Yates, 
and Benjamin (1987) predict that the greater use of 
networks would lead to more market-like relation-
ships among firms. However, Steinfield, Kraut, and 
Plummer (1995), in a broader survey of previous 
empirical research regarding inter-organizational 
structure with electronic networks, conclude that 
the more extensively firms use inter-organizational 
networks the more hierarchical are their trading 
relationships, even in cases where they are using 
public networks (such as Teletel in France). Private 
networks, as described in this paper, are even more 
likely to be hierarchical and to have closed supply 
chains because of switching costs of participants 
leaving the network. Steinfield, Kraut, and Plum-
mer also suggest that there is some evidence that it 
is easier to include lower-volume trading partners 
with fewer transactions due to lower per-unit trans-
actions costs.
Based on the observation of European firms, 
traceability has been implemented successfully 
in vertically coordinated production systems (e.g., 
Label Rouge, KAT/Wiesengold, Gilde, Scotbeef) 
and vertically integrated production systems (e.g., 
VanDrie Group and Nutreco). In no case was there 
a move to more open market structures for procure-
ment. In fact, VanDrie had difficulty coordinating 
their conventional beef operations for traceability 
because it requires more than 500 growers, versus 
the 100 growers who supply their veal operations. 
In sum, the evidence from the European case stud-
ies and the literature suggests that the benefits de-
rived from integration and production coordination 
among a closed production network of suppliers 
outweighs potential benefits the electronic network 
might create related to finding new sources of sup-
ply in an open market. By extension, those organi-
zations which are already vertically integrated or 
coordinated through production relationships will 
likely find that traceability and information technol-
ogy directly improve their management efficiency. 
The one caveat is that if information networks 
operate on an open basis with common standards, 
firms may eventually learn organizational strate-
gies that improve flexibility (a key disadvantage to 
integration described earlier) while moving some 
transactions to an open market (Malone, Yates, and 
Benjamin 1987). Figure 4 provides a schematic of 
the decision structure relating to choice of organi-
zational structure with traceability and information 
networks. 
Additional Economic Implications for the 
Firm    
Although beyond the scope of this paper, there 
are additional observations which warrant further 
consideration in regard to adopting traceability and 
information systems. In all the cases we observed, 
the participants reported that some of the greatest 
economic benefits were from the production infor-
mation and data generated as they began to monitor 
production processes more closely. 
Learning by Using, Learning By Doing, and the 
Direct Firm Value of Traceability and IT
As described earlier, traceability was adopted 
primarily as a supply-chain-management program 
driven by consumer demand. However, participants 
reported that they quickly learned that traceability 
has internal production benefits from improved in-
formation and control of production. This learning 
by using (Sundig and Zilberman 2001) stems from 
the incorporation of ERP systems at the firm level 
that inherently improve data collection as well as 
from analysis, diagnosis, and response to potential 
production problems. 
Gilde Norge, the Norwegian slaughtering plant, 
provides an example of the direct production-man-
agement benefits. In implementing traceability, 
they incorporated a visual grading system that 
ultimately allowed them to benchmark expected 
meat-cut yields from a carcass to its actual yields. 
The ongoing real-time analysis of carcass cutouts is 
attributed with adding five to seven percent to their 
final meat yields. This added internalized profit-
ability might be the greatest direct benefit when the 
ambiguity in the context of the firm organization 
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Figure 4. Balance of The Decision Process for Traceability Within The Spectrum of Open Markets 
and Vertically Integrated Firms.
Trace & Open Market        Trace & Vertical Integration
YES
Few and Infrequent Purchase/Sale 
Transactions? 
YES
Highly Complex and Complementary 
Vertical Production? 
YES
Limited Number of Suppliers 
High Frequency Purchase? 
YES
High Fixed Costs of Ownership in 
Vertical Stages? 
YES
Monitoring Tasks Overcome With 
Information Technology?  YES
YES
IT systems compatibility allows  
network effects? 
YES
Pre-existing Vertical Production 
Coordination? 
YES
Bounded Rationality as Prior 
Constraint? 
Food Safety and Recall Costs
Earlier it was suggested that overcoming informa-
tion asymmetry at the final handler-consumer inter-
face alone was not sufficient for traceability with 
branding. However, traceability at this interface 
has great benefits for reducing the recall costs of 
substandard products. This can also extend to recall 
situations within the supply chain interfaces.
Navobi, the calf-milk replacer manufacturer, 
provided an excellent example of this point. Their 
veterinary services identified a salmonella problem 
in routine on-farm testing. Through their traceabil-
ity information systems they were able to quickly 
establish that the salmonella originated on the farm 
and avoided recalling multiple related feed batches, 
as would have been done prior to traceability. Na-
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savings from traceability in this circumstance and 
estimated that in this single instance they saved over 
$100,000 in recalls and recovery costs. 
Participants suggested that valuation of traceabil-
ity in a food-safety context depends on the accuracy 
of testing and sampling procedures for detecting 
contamination, the costs of sampling and testing or 
control (HACCP) procedures, the dispersion of the 
product once it leaves the control of the firm, the 
probability of contamination itself, the costs of re-
call, and any potential costs in terms of liability and 
reputation damage. Traceability reduces the costs 
of recovering from a food contamination event and 
may reduce the probability of outbreak by improv-
ing information within the process by allowing for 
rapid identification and communication of potential 
issues among participants. 
Conclusions
The primary objective of this research is to describe 
the implementation of traceability and information 
systems in the meat and poultry sector of Europe in 
order to gain insights into the economic implications 
of traceability and the information technologies on 
inter-firm information exchange and organization. 
The intention is to clarify the economic reasons 
for traceability and provide guidance as U.S. firms 
consider implementing traceability systems. 
Traceability is often proposed primarily to over-
come the perceived information asymmetry between 
the final product handler and the consumer. How-
ever, this fails to consider that branding and product 
labeling can offer remedies for information asym-
metry. The more likely reason for implementing 
traceability is to reduce the information asymmetry 
within the supply chain. Therefore, the incentives 
to adopt traceability depend on the level of inherent 
production uncertainty and the uncertainty created 
by moral hazard and opportunism, the observability 
of traits, monitoring costs with and without adop-
tion of traceability technologies, and the extent of 
control the firm can have over these processes. The 
volume of production, the nature of aggregation and 
disaggregation in the supply chain, and the scale 
compatibilities between vertically adjacent stages 
will influence the extent of control. In general, the 
simpler the physical logistic control problem, the 
controllability, and observability of traits and inputs, 
the less valuable traceability might be within the 
supply chain. 
 In the traditional theory of the firm literature, 
vertical contracting and ownership are alternative 
solutions to product labeling, repeat purchasing, 
and certifying as mechanisms to solve informa-
tion asymmetry. Vertical coordination does so by 
removing the market interface that creates the 
information asymmetry. However, traceability and 
specifically Internet-based information systems also 
have the potential to reduce information asymmetry 
through reductions in monitoring costs, improved 
information exchange, greater quality control, and 
even reduced agency costs when coupled with 
hardware measuring technologies which interface 
directly with the information system. This infor-
mation-technology change at the inter-firm market 
level has the potential to alter transactions costs and 
therefore to influence decisions regarding inter-firm 
organization. The European cases all support the 
notion that vertical integration and coordination is 
complementary to traceability. The supply chains 
which have implemented traceability have tightly 
controlled vertical production systems even with the 
adoption of Internet technologies. However, all have 
been implemented with the past five years, so that 
as firms learn more about utilizing the information 
systems they may evolve into more market-oriented 
structures. Traceability and information technology 
are stepping into an already complex restructuring 
of meat supply chains in the U.S. and will further 
alter incentives and strategies to vertically coordi-
nate, integrate, or even return to more open mar-
kets. Evidence presented from previous research 
and the European cases suggests that traceability 
information systems will lead to tighter vertical 
relationships and more hierarchical governance 
structures.
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